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Abstract
Cloud-application add-ons are microservices that extend the
functionality of the core applications. Many application ven-
dors have opened their APIs for third-party developers and
created marketplaces for add-ons (also add-ins or apps). This
is a relatively new phenomenon, and its effects on the applica-
tion security have not been widely studied. It seems likely that
some of the add-ons have lower code quality than the core
applications themselves and, thus, may bring in security vul-
nerabilities. We found that many such add-ons are vulnerable
to cross-site scripting (XSS). The attacker can take advantage
of the document-sharing and messaging features of the cloud
applications to send malicious input to them. The vulnerable
add-ons then execute client-side JavaScript from the carefully
crafted malicious input. In a major analysis effort, we sys-
tematically studied 300 add-ons for three popular application
suites, namely Microsoft Office Online, G Suite and Shopify,
and discovered a significant percentage of vulnerable add-ons
in each marketplace. We present the results of this study, as
well as analyze the add-on architectures to understand how
the XSS vulnerabilities can be exploited and how the threat
can be mitigated.
1 Introduction
In modern web applications, user data is stored and processed
mainly in the cloud, and the user interface is implemented
with HTML and JavaScript on the web browser. This kind of
architecture has several advantages. For example, the users do
not need to install or update the applications, and sharing and
synchronizing data between users and services become eas-
ier. A well-known example of a cloud application is Google
Docs [2], an online document editor, which allows collabo-
rative editing of office documents. The users naturally need
to trust the cloud platforms to keep their data safe, and cloud-
application developers have come a long way in securing the
services.
Many of the cloud applications follow the microservice
architecture where much of the functionality is implemented
as independent services that are loosely coupled to the core
service through APIs. The APIs can also be opened to external
developers. The features implemented with these APIs are
variably called add-ons, add-ins, or apps; we use the word
add-on in this paper. For instance, the Translate [19] add-on
for Google Docs allows the user to translate text to a chosen
language — a feature that is not part of the core service.
Successful cloud applications have created marketplaces for
add-ons and aim to grow an ecosystem of innovative add-on
services around their core platform.
The growing add-on market, however, creates new dangers.
Many add-ons are quick hacks by inexperienced developers,
and the users may not be aware of the difference between
the add-on and the trusted host platform. Moreover, the host-
application vendors are under pressure to attract new add-on
developers, which can lead to less stringent security controls
for the add-ons than for the core service.
In this work, we study the security risks that arise from
potential security vulnerabilities in the add-ons. In particular,
we are interested in how the add-on services process untrusted
user input. This is a critical issue because the emphasis on
collaboration and data sharing in the cloud applications makes
it easy to exploit vulnerabilities in the handling of untrusted
data.
The focus of our analysis is on JavaScript code injection,
popularly known as cross-site scripting (XSS) [45]. Being a
prevalent attack [41], XSS has received much attention among
web security researchers [24, 32, 33, 53, 54]. However, to our
best knowledge, the dangers of XSS in the context of cloud-
application add-ons have not been extensively studied. In this
paper, we aim to fill this gap with the following contributions:
• We explain in detail how XSS attacks against cloud-
application users can occur through vulnerable add-ons.
• We analyze the architecture designs and the security
mechanisms of three popular application suites, namely
Microsoft Office Online [3], G Suite [1], and Shopify [4].
The goal is to find what the XSS attacker can gain in
each case.
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• We evaluate how widespread the problem is with an
empirical study on the add-ons from the marketplaces of
the selected application suites.
• For defensive solutions, we discuss good practices that
add-on developers can follow to secure their products.
We also present the lessons that we learned from our
analysis about design choices and their impact on the
security of an add-on system. We hope that the lessons
would be useful for any cloud-application vendors which
are developing or improving their add-on systems.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides necessary background information. Section 3 ex-
plains in detail how XSS can occur in vulnerable add-ons.
Section 4 describes our analysis on the add-on architectures
of the selected cloud-application suites. Section 5 presents the
results of the empirical study. Section 6 considers defensive
solutions. Section 7 discusses the results. Finally, Section 8
summarizes related work, and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Background
This section explains the concepts needed in the rest of the
paper, i.e. cross-site scripting and cloud-application add-ons.
2.1 Cross-site scripting
Cross-site scripting (XSS) [45] is one of the most common
vulnerabilities in web applications. In the XSS attack, the at-
tacker injects malicious client-side code, typically JavaScript,
to a website that does not sufficiently filter client input. When
honest users access the target site, the injected code is exe-
cuted in their web browsers in the same context as legitimate
scripts on the same page. Thus, the injected code may gain
unauthorized access to resources on the target site, bypassing
user authentication and the same-origin policy (SOP) [60].
XSS was first discussed in 2000 [12], and various variants
of the attack have been discovered since then. In general, XSS
attacks can be classified into four types:
1. Stored (persistent) XSS: The injected script is perma-
nently stored in a database on the target website. It is
pushed to the victim’s browser when the victim accesses
the stored information.
2. Reflected (non-persistent) XSS: The injected script is
not stored on the server. Rather, the attacker tricks the
victim’s browser into sending the script to the server,
which includes it in the immediate response page such
as an error message or search results.
3. DOM-based XSS: The injected script never reaches the
server. Instead, it is injected to the Document Object
Model (DOM) of the vulnerable web page, e.g. from a
URL query string or fragment identifier, and executed
directly on the client side.
4. Persistent client-side XSS: This is relatively new type of
XSS [53]. In the attack, the attacker injects malicious
payloads into client-side storage (e.g. Web Storage, cook-
ies) of the users that it targets. This way, if the Javascript
code of the website executes the malicious data from the
storage, the attack succeeds.
XSS variants can also be classified into server-side XSS
and client-side XSS [46]. The former occurs when untrusted
user data is included in an HTML response generated by the
server, while the latter occurs when a JavaScript call uses
untrusted user data to update the DOM of the vulnerable page
in an unsafe way.
In all types of XSS, the attacker gains access to any infor-
mation which the victim’s browser stores or processes for the
target website. Most commonly, the attacker steals cookies
that enable it to impersonate the victim to the website. The
attacker can also create a JavaScript key logger to record sen-
sitive data entered by the victim, for example, passwords and
credit card numbers. Moreover, the injected code can invoke
HTML5 APIs, such as webcam or geolocation, although some
of the APIs will only allow access if the victim has opted in
to the features for the target site.
2.2 Cloud-application add-ons
Add-on (also known as add-in, plugin, extension, or app) adds
customized commands and features to a cloud application,
called the host application. The add-on is basically a separate
web service with its own server and client components, but it
has access to the user data and some core functionality of the
host application through APIs defined by the application.
In addition to the add-on web service, each add-on has
a web front-end, which is implemented with HTML and
JavaScript. When the user starts an add-on, the host appli-
cation loads the add-on UI into an iframe and displays it
seamlessly as part of the user interface of the host application.
There are two fundamentally different ways for the add-on
UI to interact with the host application. It can either commu-
nicate locally with the host-application UI component or via
the backend servers. In the latter case, the add-on UI usually
connects to the add-on server in the cloud, which interacts
with the host application server and accesses the user data
through backend APIs that are not visible to the user.
Access control. Cloud application vendors typically imple-
ment permission-based access control for add-ons to limit
their access to user data in the host application. Each add-on
has a list of permissions which it requires to operate. The
host application usually asks the user to explicitly approve the
permissions when the user runs it for the first time or during
its installation. This access control tends to be rather coarse
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Figure 1: XSS attacks with vulnerable add-ons
grained, i.e. the user has to grant all the requested permissions
for either all user data or for a specific document. Furthermore,
the add-on retains the permissions until the user uninstalls it.
Marketplaces. Cloud application vendors often list their add-
ons in an online marketplace, from where the users can choose
and install (i.e. enable) any add-on for the applications. For
instance, the G Suite marketplace [1] lists add-ons for Google
applications such as Gmail and Google Docs. Usually, only
a relatively small number of add-ons are provided by the
application vendor itself, and the rest are built by third-party
developers.
3 XSS in vulnerable add-ons
In this paper, we focus on non-malicious add-ons. The add-
ons are written by well-meaning developers who do not intend
to cause harm but might not be security experts. Nonetheless,
such add-ons can be vulnerable to external attacks, including
XSS.
We have identified two types of XSS attacks against vul-
nerable add-ons (see Figure 1):
1. Attack with shared workspace: The attacker and the
victim are colleagues, friends or remote collaborators,
who use the same cloud application. The attacker shares
a workspace with the victim. The workspace concept
varies depending on the host application, but it basically
is any environment, such as a Google Docs document,
through which changes made by one user are propagated
to the others. The attacker injects malicious JavaScript
code into the shared workspace. If the text would be
visible to the user, it can be hidden with the usual tech-
niques like using small font size or text color matching
the background. When the victim enables a vulnerable
add-on for the shared workspace and the add-on renders
the attacker’s input in an unsafe way, the injected script
may become part of the web page in the add-on iframe,
where it is executed by the victim’s web browser. Thus,
the attacker has performed an XSS attack on the victim.
2. Attack with outside input: Some host applications ac-
cept external input such as messages from non-users.
For example, if the host application is an email service
(e.g. Gmail or Outlook), the attacker can hide the mali-
cious script in an email and send it to the victim. If the
victim has enabled a vulnerable add-on to process emails,
the injected script may again find its way to the add-on’s
iframe and be executed there like any JavaScript in that
frame.
The details of how the attacker injects the script into the
shared workspace are naturally specific to the cloud appli-
cation, to the add-on, and to the vulnerability that is being
exploited. In any case, the root cause of the above attacks
is that the vulnerable add-on routes the untrusted user in-
put to JavaScript’s data flow sinks in the add-on UI without
sanitizing it. In particular, malicious data from the attacker
can be executed if the add-on renders it as HTML rather
than as text (with HTML element sinks e.g. document.write
or document.body.innerHTML). The attack would also suc-
ceed if the attacker’s content is given as input to JavaScript
methods such as eval and setTimeout which convert string
input to code. (The latter type of mistakes are less likely
though, because of developer awareness of the dangers of
such functions.)
Compared to the traditional variants of XSS (see Sec-
tion 2.1), the attacks that we describe here are similar to
stored XSS because the attacker’s malicious input is stored
in the host application’s data store. Also, they can be either
server-side XSS or client-side XSS depending on whether the
malicious data is processed by the add-on server or by the
add-on UI.
General consequences. With the ability to run arbitrary
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scripts in the context of the vulnerable add-on, the attacker
can perform at least the following types of attacks:
• The attacker can access data on the add-on server
through its APIs. In a microservice architecture, the add-
on server is likely to have its own data storage.
• The attacker may be able to access data in the host
application with cross-domain messaging, or indirectly
through the add-on server. The ability to do this depends
on the design of the host application and its add-on APIs.
• The attacker can spoof another user interface in the add-
on iframe and trick the user into entering confidential
data or credentials.
• As in all XSS attacks, the attacker can access HTML5
APIs and request access to local resources, such as ge-
olocation, or authorization to external resources owned
by the victim user.
We will discuss the designs of different host applications
and analyze what the attacker can gain in each case in Sec-
tion 4. It is important to understand that the malicious script
runs in the iframe with a different origin than the host ap-
plication. Thus, it cannot access the DOM model of the host-
application within the web browser or the cookies related to
the host application. Instead, any access to host-application
data has to be gained either through published APIs in the
add-on server or with cross-origin access methods.
4 Analysis of XSS consequences
To understand better what consequences there are to the ex-
ecution of malicious code, we analyzed the add-on system
architectures of three popular cloud application suites: Mi-
crosoft (MS) Office Online [3], G Suite [1], and Shopify [4].
This section presents our analysis in detail, and Table 2 at the
end of the section summarizes the results.
4.1 MS Office Online add-ons
MS Office Online is a cloud-based office suite, which includes
popular office applications like Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and
Outlook. The applications in the suite all have the same ar-
chitecture, illustrated in Figure 2. The add-on UI is displayed
inside the host application UI, which allows the user to inter-
act with the add-on seamlessly when using the application.
The add-on UI is contained in an iframe and has a different
origin than the encapsulating application, which prevents it
from directly accessing user data in the host application.
The add-on interacts with the host application on the client
side via JavaScript APIs. Specifically, MS Office Online ap-
plications use window.postMessage() [43] for cross-origin
office.live.com/Word.aspx
Add-on 
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Figure 2: MS Office Online add-on architecture
messaging between the add-on’s iframe and the parent appli-
cation window. The add-on can request different levels of ac-
cess to the host-application data [37], shown in Table 1. If the
host application is Word, Excel, PowerPoint or OneNote, the
add-on can only request access to the current document that
the user is working on. Outlook add-ons, on the other hand,
can request access not only to the current item (i.e. email or
compose form) but also to the user’s whole mailbox. Outlook
add-ons can also call getCallbackTokenAsync(), a special
API that returns an access token with the permission level of
the add-on. The add-on UI running in the browser can send
this token to the add-on server, which can use it to access the
email server [39] on the add-on’s behalf for a limited time.
4.1.1 XSS exploits
Let us consider how an attacker can exploit an MS Office
Online add-on that is vulnerable to XSS. First, the victim
needs to install the add-on. Then, depending on the add-on, the
attacker can exploit the situation with either of the two attack
vectors that we presented in Section 3: it can inject malicious
scripts into a document that is shared with the victim, or in
the case of Outlook, it can send an email that contains the
malicious scripts to the victim. Below, we consider what kind
of access the attacker can gain to the user’s data in the host
application.
Get the same level of access as the add-on. Because of the
local messaging with the host application window, the attacker
can access any resources that the add-on is permitted to access.
Since the attacker’s scripts run within the add-on’s iframe, it
is not possible for the host application to differentiate between
malicious requests from the attackers and legitimate ones.
If the host application is Word, Excel, PowerPoint or
OneNote, the attacker can access only the open document.
This might not always be useful to the attacker because the
document was originally shared with the attacker. However,
the attacker can use the injected script as a backdoor to retain
his access even after the victim revokes his legitimate access,
e.g. by making a personal copy of a form or template before
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Table 1: MS Office Online add-on permission levels
Application Permission Description
Outlook
Restricted Read phone numbers, addresses, and URLs from the current item
ReadItem Read all properties of the current item
ReadWriteItem Full access to the current item
ReadWriteMailbox Full access to the mailbox
Word, Excel,
PowerPoint,
OneNote
Restricted Read/write settings of the add-in that are stored in the current document
ReadDocument Read only the text in the current document
ReadAllDocument Read everything in the current document, which includes text, formatting, links, graphics, etc.
WriteDocument Write to the user’s selection in the current document.
ReadWriteDocument Full access to the current document
filling it with confidential data. In Outlook, on the other hand,
the attacker will gain full access to the victim’s mailbox if
the vulnerable add-on has the ReadWriteMailbox permission.
This means that the attacker can read all of the victim’s emails
and send emails on the victim’s behalf.
Request an OAuth 2.0 token. As noted earlier, the ability to
control the iframe enables the attacker to spoof parts of the
application user interface, which makes it possible to trick
the user in various ways, such as phishing for confidential
data. We found, however, one specific trick that the attacker
can play on MS Office Online users. Many add-ons act as the
connectors between the MS Office Online applications and
third-party web services built on the Azure platform. Such
an add-on only provides a UI for the user to interact with the
third-party backend server. Instead of acting like an add-on
server, the server uses more powerful APIs for interacting
with the host application. To obtain such access, the service
provider must register an Azure application with the Microsoft
identity platform [36], and the user must authorize the appli-
cation to access the necessary resources. The authorization is
based on OAuth 2.0 [26] as follows. The add-on displays a
popup that shows information about the application includ-
ing the name, logo and domain, as well as the permissions
that the application is requesting, as illustrated in Figure 3. If
the user agrees to authorize the application, the application
will receive an access token, which it can use to access the
requested resources from anywhere.
Since the users of MS Office Online add-ons are already fa-
miliar with the OAuth authorization prompt, the attacker can
exploit it to phish for access rights. First, the attacker creates
an Azure application with the exact same name as the vul-
nerable add-on. This is possible because Azure applications
do not need to have unique names. With the injected script,
the attacker requests authorization for some of the user’s re-
sources. If the victim authorizes the attacker’s application, the
attacker can use the access token to access the victim’s data
in the host application from anywhere. The token is similar
to the Outlook token discussed above but applicable to any of
the MS Office Online applications. It is difficult for the victim
user to judge whether a particular add-on should be granted
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Figure 3: MS Office Online add-on authorization prompt
an OAuth 2.0 token or limited to the add-on APIs.
4.1.2 Case study: Translator for Outlook
We will use the "Translator for Outlook" [38], an add-on de-
veloped by Microsoft itself, to demonstrate the exploits. As
the name suggests, it is an add-on for the email service Out-
look, which translates the user’s emails to a selected language.
The main workflow of the add-on is as follows.
1. The user starts the add-on. The host application will
display the add-on as a side panel in its UI.
2. The user selects the language that she wants to translate
the opening email to.
3. The add-on translates the whole email to the selected
language and displays the result.
The problem with the add-on is that it renders the translated
text as HTML without escaping the text first. As the result,
if the attacker, which could be anyone on the Internet, sends
an email that contains malicious scripts to the victim and the
victim tries to translate it with the add-on, the scripts will
be executed. The add-on, however, only has the ReadItem
permission. Thus, by exploiting the local messaging with the
host application alone, the attacker will not be able to read
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Figure 4: G Suite add-on architecture
the victim’s mailbox or send emails on the victim’s behalf.
To gain such access rights, the attacker can use his malicious
scripts to request an OAuth 2.0 token as we described in the
previous section.
4.2 G Suite add-ons
G Suite is another office suite, which is developed by Google.
Some well-known examples of the applications in the suite
are Google Docs, Google Sheets, and Gmail.
Before going into details about how G Suite add-ons work,
we need to understand the concept of Google APIs [17]. They
are a set of APIs that give programmatic access to many
Google products, such as Google Maps and Google Drive.
For a client (e.g. a website) to access private user data using
the APIs, it must be first attached to a Google Cloud Platform
(GCP) project [18]. The client then needs to obtain an access
token with OAuth as follows. First, the user is redirected to
the Google Authorization website, where the user must sign
in with her Google account. The website then displays an
authorization prompt showing the name of the GCP project
and the permissions that the client is requesting. If the user
grants the permissions, the Google Authorization server sends
the access token to the client. Otherwise, the client receives
an error.
Figure 4 shows the architecture of G Suite add-ons. The
main difference between them and MS Office Online’s is
that G Suite add-ons are completely hosted on the Google
cloud. The add-on server is basically a Google APIs client that
can directly interact with the user data. The add-on UI sends
requests to interfaces defined by the add-on server, and the
server implements the desired action on user data as well as
returns responses. The server interfaces can only be accessed
by add-on code that originates from the same server. One
example is Translate [19], a Google Docs add-on provided by
<Add-on's name> wants to access your
Google Account
This will allow <Add-on's name> to:
View and manage your Google Docs documents
Display and run third-party web content in
prompts and sidebars inside Google applications
@gmail.com
Figure 5: G Suite add-on authorization prompt
Google. Its server has two main interfaces: one translates the
user-selected text and returns the result, and the other replaces
the text of the current selection with the translated text.
Since the add-on server is a Google APIs client, it must
be authorized before it can access the user’s private data.
This occurs when the user starts the add-on for the first time.
Figure 5 shows a typical authorization prompt. If the user
approves, the add-on server obtains an access token with the
requested permissions.
G Suite add-ons can request permissions to access user
data in any G Suite applications. For example, a Google
Docs add-on can request permissions to send emails from
the user’s Gmail account. While this cross-application per-
missions model makes the add-ons flexible and powerful,
malicious add-ons could exploit it to gain access to a wide
range of user data by, for example, requesting permissions
to “Read, compose, send, and permanently delete all your
email from Gmail” and “See, edit, create, and delete all of
your Google Drive files”. To mitigate such threats, Google
performs manual verification of add-ons that request sensitive
permissions [23] to ensure that the add-ons comply with the
Google API User Data Policy [22].
4.2.1 XSS exploits
Next, we consider what kind of access a successful XSS at-
tacker can get to user data.
Get the same access as the add-on. At first glance, since
the host application window does not accept local messages
from the add-on UI, it appears that the XSS attacker cannot
access the victim’s data. However, there is a very common
Google API used by the add-on UIs that allows the attacker to
bypass this limitation: Google provides the Picker API [20]
for the user to select a file or folder that is stored in Google
servers. Like any other Google APIs, the Picker API requires
an access token to operate. The add-on servers commonly
create an interface by which the add-on code running in the
browser can obtain a copy of the server’s token; this is even
recommended practice [21]. The server’s token, however, is
not limited to the Picker API. Now, the injected XSS code can
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also request the access token, and thus it will gain the same
permissions to the user’s data as the add-on server has.
Request an OAuth 2.0 token. If the vulnerable add-on does
not use the Picker API, the attacker can turn the injected script
into a Google APIs JavaScript client and request an OAuth
2.0 token from the user. In that case, an authorization prompt
is displayed to the victim in the same way as when an add-
on requests permissions in its first run (see Figure 5). While
the attacker must use his own GCP project for his malicious
client, it could choose a name for the project that matches the
add-on’s name.
This is similar to the phishing exploit that we presented for
Office Online add-ons in Section 4.1.1. We believe that this
attack will have a high success rate because G Suite users are
already familiar with the authorization prompt, and the victim
might think that the add-on has been updated and needs new
permissions.
4.2.2 Case study: Form Ranger
Form Ranger [14] is an add-on for Google Form with the
most number of users. Google Forms is an online service that
helps collect information from users via surveys and quizzes,
and the add-on allows automatically populating a form with
data from any spreadsheet in the user’s Google Drive. The
main workflow of the add-on is as follows.
1. The user starts the add-on. The host application will
display the add-on as a side panel in its UI.
2. The add-on shows the list of questions in the form. For
each question, the add-on allows the user to populate the
answer options with data from a spreadsheet.
3. The user selects a question, and the add-on displays a list
of all spreadsheets that are stored in the user’s Google
Drive. Note that the Picker API is used here.
4. The user selects a document in the list, and the add-on
allows selecting which sheet and which column in the
sheet that the user wants to import data from. A preview
of the data in the column is also displayed.
5. The user select a sheet and a column, and the add-on
populates the question with the data in the column.
At this point, the readers can probably guess in which
step the add-on is vulnerable: in Step 4, the add-on does
not filter or escape the data from the selected spreadsheet
document and renders it as HTML. Thus, if the attacker has
access to the document (e.g. the attacker and the victim are
collaborators), it can hide malicious JavaScript code in the
part of the document that will be used as the form inputs and
the code will be executed when the victim uses the add-on.
Since the add-on uses Picker API (Step 3), the attacker can
steal its access token and gain all of its permissions, which
Add-on
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Shopify 
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Shop
UI
Add-on 
UI
Figure 6: Shopify add-on architecture
include the following: “See, edit, create, and delete all of
your Google Drive files”, “See, edit, create, and delete your
spreadsheets in Google Drive”, “View and manage your forms
in Google Drive”, and “Send email as you”.
We can see that the add-on has more permissions that it
actually needs. For example, it does not need the ability to
send emails on the user’s behalf. It also does not need access
to all of the Google Drive files; read access to the spreadsheets
only should be sufficient. Because of these unnecessary per-
missions, the attacker will be able to access all of the victim’s
Google Drive files and send emails on the victim’s behalf. If
the attacker wants to gain even more access rights (e.g. read
the victim’s emails), it can phish to obtain an OAuth 2.0 token
as we described in the previous section.
4.3 Shopify add-ons
Shopify is an e-commerce platform with which small mer-
chants can create online shops. It offers services such as
payment, marketing, and customer engagement. Each shop is
managed through a web admin interface, on which the owner
can access the built-in services of the platform to, for example,
add new products to the shop, engage with users, or manage
orders. Shopify add-ons integrate third-party services into this
admin interface.
The add-on architecture is illustrated in Figure 6. The add-
on server runs in the cloud and accesses the shop data with
the Shopify REST APIs over HTTPS. Typically, the add-on
server is authorized to access the shop server with an OAuth
2.0 access token, which it obtains as follows. When the user
starts the add-on for the first time, the shop’s admin interface
shows an authorization prompt with a list of the data that
the add-on requests to access (e.g. orders, products). If the
user agrees, the Shopify server sends an access token to a pre-
registred endpoint on the add-on server. The add-on server
can then use the token to access the requested data. Later, the
add-on can renew the access tokens without prompting the
user.
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Table 2: Analysis summary
Application Add-on’s data access Add-on’s logic Attack vectors Exploits
MS Office
Online
Host application only In frontend Shared workspace
Outside input
- Get the same level of access as the add-on
- Request an OAuth 2.0 token
G Suite Any applications In backend Shared workspace
Outside input
- Get the same level of access as the add-on
only if the Picker API is used
- Request an OAuth 2.0 token
Shopify Host application only In backend Shared workspace - Install a malicious add-on
The add-on UI is embedded into a menu in the shop’s admin
interface. Shopify provides a set of local JavaScript APIs [50]
for the add-on UI to perform resource-picking operations.
Specifically, the add-on UI communicates with the shop’s
admin interface via window.postMessage(), and the admin
interface asks the user to pick resources of the requested type.
The admin interface then returns the result data objects to the
add-on.
A shop on Shopify can have an owner and multiple staff
members. The shop owner has full access to the shop and can
grant the other staff members access to some (or all) admin
features including add-ons [51]. The view through an add-
on’s UI is based on the intersection of the member’s and the
add-on’s permissions.
4.3.1 XSS exploits
With Shopify, the attacker must be a staff member who is able
to inject malicious scripts into the shop resources (i.e. the
“shared workspace” attack vector). We found that Shopify
prevents including HTML or scripts in customer information,
but it is possible to inject scripts into the product and order
descriptions. These scripts will be executed when other staff
members use a vulnerable add-on that renders them in an
unsafe way.
Install a malicious add-on. The Shopify add-on architec-
ture has the good points of both MS Office Online and G
Suite. In particular, the access token is sent directly to the
add-on server and, thus, is not accessible to the add-on UI
by default. Also, the local JavaScript APIs allow the add-on
UI to perform resource-picking operations without exposing
the shop data because it is processed in the admin interface.
Nevertheless, it is possible for the attacker to trick the shop
owner or another authorized victim into installing a malicious
add-on. Unlike MS Office Online and G Suite applications,
whose add-ons can only be installed from the respective mar-
ketplaces, Shopify users can initiate the installation process
of a new add-on just by visiting a URL. Thus, the attacker
can create a malicious add-on with a name similar to that of
the vulnerable add-on and initiate its installation from the
injected script. The victim might think that the add-on has
been updated and it needs to be authorized again. Depending
on the extent of the permissions granted, the malicious add-on
can then access any shop data.
4.3.2 Case study: Order Printer Pro
Order Printer Pro [15] is one of the most popular add-ons in
the “Orders and shipping” category on the Shopify market-
place. The add-on allows its users to quickly create order-
related documents (e.g. invoices, return forms) as well as
printing or delivering them to the customers. The workflow
for printing an order is as follows.
1. The user starts the add-on from the admin interface. The
host application will display the add-on as a part of its
UI.
2. The user selects the “Orders” menu of the add-on UI.
The add-on will show a list of the orders of the shop.
3. The user selects the order that she wants to print. The
add-on will display the order and action buttons that
allow the user to print the order or export the order as a
PDF document. The displayed information includes the
customer’s shipping address, the items in the order, and
the notes that are written by the staff members if any.
4. The user clicks on the “Print” button and the order will
be printed.
The problem with the add-on is that when it displays the
order’s information, it does not render the notes in a safe
way. Consequently, if the notes contain JavaScript snipets, the
snipets will be executed. As we mentioned in the previous
section, Shopify does not prevent including HTML or scripts
in the field. Thus, any staff member that have write access
to the orders of the shop can perform XSS on other staff
members, including the shop owner.
5 Empirical analysis
To find out how widespread the XSS issue in cloud-
application add-ons is in the wild, we conducted an empirical
analysis by looking for vulnerable add-ons in the market-
places of the three selected cloud application suites. In this
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section, we first present our approach for shortlisting the add-
ons, followed by the methodology that we used for systemati-
cally finding vulnerabilities in the shortlisted add-ons. Finally,
we show the analysis results.
5.1 Shortlisting add-ons for analysis
We consider only free add-ons from the marketplaces. Table 3
shows the number of such add-ons as of August 2019. Note
that Microsoft and Shopify officially use the terms add-in and
app, respectively.
Table 3: Add-on marketplaces (August 2019)
Marketplace Terminology Available free
MS Office Online add-in 1150
G Suite add-on 1180
Shopify app 1265
We selected 100 free add-ons from each of the three mar-
ketplaces — 50 popular ones that are likely to have many
users, and another 50 selected randomly— resulting in a total
of 300 add-ons for the study. The criteria used for shortlisting
the add-ons are as follows.
MS Office Online: We focused on add-ons for the following
applications in the suite: Word, Excel, OneNote, Outlook,
and PowerPoint. The remaining applications either have no
add-ons or the add-ons are available only to domain users.
Since the marketplace does not show the number of users for
each add-on, we shortlisted the top 50 add-ons based on the
number of reviews.
G Suite: The applications available to individual users in-
clude Gmail, Docs, Sheets, Slides, Forms, Drive, and Calen-
dar. We excluded Drive or Calendar because their add-ons
only add new menus to the application UI, which means that
they do not have any client-side code, leaving no room for the
XSS attacker. From the remaining applications, we shortlisted
50 add-ons with the highest number of users.
Shopify: We first sorted add-ons in the marketplace by the
“Most installed” option, and then we shortlisted the first 50
add-ons from the result. Note that the marketplace does not
show the number of installations of each add-on; instead, it
shows only the rating and the number of reviews.
5.2 Analysis methodology
We manually analyze the selected add-ons with black-box test-
ing. There are several challenges with automatically verifying
whether an add-on would cause XSS vulnerability. First, state-
of-the-art automated techniques for detecting XSS vulnerabil-
ities typically work only with client-side XSS [33, 35, 49, 53],
while the nature of the XSS attacks against cloud-application
add-ons vary depending on both the host application and the
implementation of the add-on. Specifically, the vulnerabilities
of MS Office Online add-ons are always on the client side
because the attacker’s malicious input is propagated to the
add-on via local messaging (i.e. window.postMessage())
and processed by the add-on UI. The vulnerabilities of G
Suite and Shopify add-ons, on the other hand, can be either
on the client side or on the server side depending on whether
the add-on server returns the attacker’s raw input to the client
or it renders the data beforehand. Second, unlike traditional
web applications where a significant portion of the workflows
can be analyzed by loading every available URL in the web-
sites with a browser, most functionality of an add-on can
only be triggered by user actions. In addition, there is no sin-
gle standard method to invoke an add-on. Some start by the
user clicking and selecting the add-on from a host-application
menu, while the others require further user interaction to reach
a point where the XSS code may be executed. Third, most
automated XSS detection approaches in the literature do not
involve user logging in. However, many add-ons act as the
connectors between their host applications and third-party
web services; thus, they require their users to create an ac-
count and log in before they can be used so that they keep
track of the user data. The registration processes vary greatly,
making them difficult to be done without manual user interac-
tion. Because of these reasons, we leave automatic detection
of XSS vulnerabilities in cloud-application add-ons to future
work.
Black-box testing. For each add-on, we first installed it and
tried to understand its features. We then created a test item
for each of the target applications as follows.
• For document editing applications in MS Office On-
line and G Suite (e.g. Word, Excel, Google Docs,
Google Sheets), the test item was a corresponding doc-
ument. To make sure that every source of data that
the add-on was going to process contained JavaScript
code, we added simple JavaScript snipets to every
part of the document. For instance, if it was a spread-
sheet, we included JavaScript code in the name of
each sheet, the heading of each column, and some
cells in each column. An example of the snippets is
<script>console.log(“Pwned!!!”)</script>.
• For email applications (i.e. Outlook, Gmail), the test
item was an email that we sent to ourselves. Like with
document editing applications, we inserted scripts to the
subject and every part of the email’s body.
• For Shopify: We first created a test shop. As we men-
tioned in Section 4.3.1, it is possible to injects scripts
only into the products and orders. Thus, we created sev-
eral test products and orders in the shop, and we added
scripts into every possible places, such as the name and
the description of the items.
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Table 4: Vulnerable add-ons found in our empirical analysis
Marketplace Selection
criterion
Vulnerable add-ons Attack vector Status
MS Office Online Popular Translator for Outlook Outside input Fixing
GIGRAPH - Network Visualization Shared workspace No response
Random Duplicate Remover Shared workspace Fixing
Bubbles Shared workspace No response
Radial Bar Chart Shared workspace No response
Excel to JSON Shared workspace No response
WritingAssistant Shared workspace No response
Excel to SMS Shared workspace No response
G Suite Popular Form Ranger Shared workspace Fixing
Flubaroo Shared workspace No response
autoCrat Shared workspace Fixing
formMule - Email Merge Utility Shared workspace Fixing
docAppender Shared workspace Fixing
Grackle Sheets Shared workspace No response
Sheetgo Shared workspace Fixing
Random Form Duplicates Shared workspace No response
Bulk Sheet Manager Shared workspace No response
rosterSync - Teacher Edition Shared workspace Fixing
Notifications for Forms Shared workspace No response
Text gBlaster (SMS Texting) Shared workspace No response
Mail Merge Shared workspace No response
Response Editor Shared workspace No response
Doc Variables Shared workspace Fixed
Shopify Popular Order Printer Pro Shared workspace No response
Random ShipHero Fulfillment Shared workspace Fixing
Simple Admin Shared workspace No response
ShipRelay Fulfillment Shared workspace No response
Ship Systems 3D Box Packing Shared workspace No response
After creating the test item, we tried all functions of each
add-on on the test item and looked for workflows that involve
rendering the content of the item. We also added more custom
JavaScript code in a number of cases because some add-ons
only considered data in specific formats. For example, with
Doc Variables [34] — an add-on that allows defining and
using variables in Google Docs documents — we had to
insert our script into a variable’s definition, which was in
the format: ${variable_name}. If any of the injected script
snippets were executed, we concluded that the add-on was
vulnerable to XSS.
While our analysis was manual, we believe that it is suffi-
cient to find most, if not all, XSS vulnerabilities in the selected
add-ons. The main reason is that, compared to standalone web
services, add-ons are usually quite simple with a relatively
small number of features. The number of places where the
user can inject scripts is also limited. Thus, it is not difficult
to understand and manually test all the workflows of an add-
on with the black-box testing method. However, while our
methodology is sufficient to produce results that, in our opin-
ion, need wider attention, it is clearly not practical for those
who want to perform large scale analyses of cloud-application
add-ons. A more complete and efficient approach is needed
in the future for such purpose.
5.3 Results and responsible disclosure
We found 28 vulnerable add-ons among the 300 analyzed
ones, which is around 9%. The result indicates that XSS vul-
nerabilities are common in cloud-application add-ons today.
Table 4 shows the names of the add-ons, the attack vectors,
and whether the add-ons have been fixed. Among the three
marketplaces, only the G Suite shows the number of users of
each add-on, and the vulnerable add-on with the greatest num-
ber of users in the marketplace, Form Ranger, had roughly
7,8 million users as of August 2019. The most popular vul-
nerable add-ons in the Microsoft Office Online and Shopify
marketplaces are Translator for Outlook and Order Printer
Pro, respectively. The former had 1772 reviews, and the latter
had 371 reviews.
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We can see that the vulnerability rate in the set of popular
add-ons appears lower in all the three marketplaces. This
could be because popular add-ons are more likely to be written
by more experienced developers. Also, it seems that add-
ons that are vulnerable to outside input are rare. Specifically,
only one add-on in our study is vulnerable. We hypothesize
that add-on developers are more familiar with threats from
outside input (i.e. emails in this case) than those from shared
workspace.
We have disclosed the vulnerabilities to all of the add-on
developers that we were able to contact. We also provided
guidance on how the security bugs could be fixed (see the
solutions for add-on developers in Section 6). At the moment
of writing, of the 28 add-on teams/developers that we have
contacted, 1 has acknowledged and fixed their add-on, 9 has
acknowledged the vulnerabilities but are still working on
the fixes, and the others have not responded to us. We also
discussed the problem of the Picker API with Google. They
confirmed the problem and said that they would take it into
account in the next version of their add-on system.
6 Defenses
In this section, we discuss what the add-on developers and
cloud application vendors can do to defend against the XSS
attacks caused by vulnerable add-ons.
6.1 Solutions for add-on developers
To prevent XSS, add-on developers should not add untrusted
data to the add-on UI as HTML because it can contain mali-
cious JavaScript code. We discuss some practices that they
can follow below.
Coding practices. Secure coding practices to prevent XSS
are a common topic in web security literature [24, 40, 47]. A
straightforward way to prevent XSS in cloud-application add-
ons is to always render user input as text instead of HTML.
Instead of the innerHTML property, the developer should use
the innerText and textContent properties to insert text.
With jQuery, the .text() method should be used instead of
the .html() method.
In general, user data should not be interpreted as web appli-
cation code. However, in the rare cases where it is necessary
to render untrusted HTML as part of the add-on UI, the de-
veloper needs to properly validate and escape on the input
first. On the server side, most web frameworks have built-in
functions for such tasks. On the client side, JavaScript meth-
ods like .toStaticHTML() can be used to remove dynamic
HTML elements and attributes in the user data before ren-
dering it. We refer to [47] for a detailed guidance on how to
escape characters to prevent XSS.
Security enforcement. Since add-ons are basically web ser-
vices, add-on developers could implement a Content Security
Policy (CSP) [52] to enforce some defenses on their add-ons.
An extreme policy is to ban execution of all inline scripts
(e.g. <script> tags, inline event handlers). With such policy,
even if the attacker managed to insert malicious scripts to the
add-on UI, the scripts would not be executed. Only JavaScript
code that are in separate .js files and loaded from trusted
servers that the developers have whitelisted are allowed to
run.
However, completely prohibiting inline scripts is not al-
ways ideal because legitimate inline scripts are preferred for
various tasks. For example, event handlers are usually im-
plemented in inline scripts. Moving inline event handlers to
separate .js files cannot be done by simply copying and past-
ing the code; instead, they need to be rewritten with DOM
APIs. Fortunately, CSP can be used in a less extreme way
to avoid the hassle. Specifically, hash-based or nonce-based
policies can be implemented so that inline scripts with pre-
registered hash or nonce values are allowed to execute.
Add-on developers should also minimize the permissions
that their add-ons request. As we can see from the case of
the Form Ranger add-on (Section 4.2.2), the unnecessary
permissions that the add-on has enable the XSS attacker to
steal all of the victim’s Google Drive files as well as sending
emails on the victim’s behalf.
There are also other generic practices that help to defend
against XSS [47]. For example, the HTTPOnly flag of session
cookie and any custom cookies that are not accessed by any
JavaScript code should always be set. Also, many web frame-
works provide automatic escaping functionality [5,16], which
should be used whenever possible.
XSS detection. Add-on developers can also utilize the
method that we used for our empirical analysis (Section 5.2)
to check whether their add-ons are vulnerable. Specifically,
they can create similar test items as we did and write unit
tests to continuosly check for XSS vulnerabilities during their
development cycle. While our method does not scale well, it
should be sufficient for testing individual add-ons.
6.2 Lessons for cloud-application vendors
In Section 4, we analyzed the designs of three popular add-
on systems and what an XSS attack can achieve in them.
This section presents the lessons that we learned from the
analysis about design choices and their impact on the security
of add-ons. We hope that the lessons would be useful for any
cloud-application vendors which are developing or improving
their add-on systems.
Harden the add-on iframe. The add-on UI is contained
in an iframe, and by default, the code in the iframe can
call browser APIs to request access to features on the local
device, such as geolocation, microphone, and camera. The
host application should restrict the browser features which
the add-on iframe can access, which can be done by setting
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the allow and sandbox properties of the iframe [42].
At the moment, there is an experimental feature in the
Chrome and Opera browsers that allows the host application
to enforce a CSP policy on add-ons. Specifically, the browsers
add a new property to the iframe elements, namely csp,
which can be used to specify a policy which the embedded
page must enforce upon itself [59]. If this property becomes
a standard feature of browsers, it gives cloud-application ven-
dors control over the CSP policy in their add-ons. However,
we observe that most of the add-ons in our analysis did not
use CSP. Thus, deploying such restriction would not be an
easy task for the vendors because a meaningful CSP, such
as allowing only inline scripts whose hash or nonce match
a specified value to run, would break many add-ons in their
marketplaces.
Implement add-on logic in the add-on server, not in client-
side JavaScript. Cross-origin messaging within the browser,
as used in MS Office Online, enables low-latency access from
the add-on to user data that is available in the main applica-
tion UI. However, this access is only controlled by relatively
coarse-grained generic permissions, such as those in Table 1.
We can see that such access control is not useful when defend-
ing against XSS attackers because their malicious scripts are
executed in the context of the add-on. Therefore, the add-on
logic should be implemented on the server side, as G Suite
and Shopify have done. The add-on server would act a a layer
of isolation between the client-side script and user data in the
cloud application in two ways. First, the add-on server defines
a limited, purpose-specific interface through which all access
to user data has to go. Second, the add-on server implements
business logic that further filters the kinds of read and write
operations that are passed on to the cloud application. Both
mechanisms act as filters between the potential XSS code
that has taken over the add-on iframe in the browser and the
user’s data.
Filter scripts in user input. The host application vendors
should think thoroughly about the types of user input that their
applications need to receive in a shared workspace and filter
for unwanted types. For example, Shopify deals with shop
resources such as products and orders, which are relatively
structured data. Thus, the developers know where HTML or
scripts should not appear. The G Suite and MS Office Online
applications are more problematic in this respect because the
input to them is mostly documents, where legitimate HTML
and scripts can appear in unexpected places.
Do not share access tokens to delegate all your permis-
sions. OAuth 2.0 tokens are bearer tokens, and anyone in
possession of the token can use it for resource access. This
can lead to unsafe coding practices where too powerful tokens
are delegated to unsafe places — as we saw in the case of the
Picker API in G Suite. Instead of sharing its access token with
the client side, the add-on server should mediate the access.
Where tokens need to be shared, they should only convey the
absolute minimum permissions needed by the client side. In
the case of the Picker API, for example, the add-on server
should delegate to the UI a restricted token that can only be
used to list specific files in the user’s Google Drive.
Avoid asking user consent at runtime. Relying on user judg-
ment when authorizing add-ons to access user data may not
be as good an idea as it first seems. In particular, prompting
the user for consent at runtime conditions the user to answer-
ing yes to every such prompt, including ones from injected
malicious code. Thus, it may be better to ask for user con-
sent only in a separate UI where the user installs or upgrades
add-ons. On the negative side, that prevents document-level
access control.
7 Discussion and future work
Since cross-site scripting is a well-known vulnerability, pru-
dent engineering practices have been developed to prevent
such mistakes [48]. On one hand, developers are aware of the
need to filter untrusted input, and on the other, cloud appli-
cation vendors have developed platforms and toolchains that
make their products immune to most types of code injection.
Nevertheless, the problem has not been completely solved. On
one hand, attackers find new ways of bypassing the defenses
and, on the other, the speed of software development makes
it difficult for threat analysis and defenses to stay up to date.
This paper is doing its part to catch up with the development
in one key area of modern software.
We have confirmed by experiments that the vulnerabili-
ties described in this paper are real and exploitable. There
are, however, some additional practical considerations that a
real-world attacker would face. The attacker needs to know
which vulnerable add-on the victim is using, and the victim
has to enable the add-on on the shared document. Thus, a
successful attack probably requires a vulnerable add-on that
users regularly invoke on large classes of documents which
they are reading or editing. Translator and writing-assistant
add-ons could meet these criteria. Add-ons that fix problems
in data, such as duplicate removers, could even be installed by
the victim when they receive a document with the matching
problem.
In addition to the XSS vulnerabilities in the add-ons, an-
other serious issue discovered in this paper is the way OAuth
2.0 tokens are used in the Picker API, and the powerful ex-
ploits that it enables for the XSS attacker. The Picker API doc-
umentation has educated developers to use a design pattern
where an add-on server shares its OAuth 2.0 with a client-side
script. Even if the Picker API itself is replaced with a safer
solution, this unsafe software pattern might persist among
developers.
For these reasons, some further measures may be needed to
prevent unsafe use of the access tokens. G Suite has the advan-
tage that the add-on server runs in the Google cloud, and the
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access token is handled by the third-party code only in special
cases, which could be monitored and blocked. Also, host ap-
plications could relatively easily reject tokens that come from
somewhere other than the authorized add-on server. Such re-
strictions on the token usage would, however, take away the
convenience and flexibility of bearer tokens that has made
them popular with developers. Indeed, the designers of OAuth
2.0 have intentionally not built in support for channel bind-
ing, such as binding the token to a specific client address. In
conclusion, there are ways of mitigating the threat caused by
unsafe delegation of access tokens to client-side scripts, but it
might take some time for the problem to go away entirely.
Overall, we hope that this paper will attract more attention
to the area of cloud-application add-ons since further work
is clearly needed. There might be other attack vectors that al-
low the attacker to exploit non-malicious add-ons. Analyzing
threats from malicious add-ons could also be an interesting
area for future work.
8 Related work
In this section, we survey related literature about XSS at-
tacks and security analysis of add-on ecosystems outside the
domain of web applications.
XSS vulnerabilities. XSS has been one of the most com-
mon and harmful vulnerabilities in web applications. In spite
of the availability of detection and defense mechanisms and
changes in the architecture of web applications, XSS remains
a prevalent problem [13, 53]. Security research literature on
XSS includes a comprehensive overview [25], detection mech-
anisms [28, 30, 58], as well as preventive and defense solu-
tions [10, 31, 44, 55–57].
The rich literature on defenses again XSS includes both
client and server-side solutions. Many of them can help to
defend against the attacks presented in this paper.
Client-side solutions involve sanitizing user input before it
is sent to the server. However, distinguishing between trusted
and untrusted content and filtering out any malicious scripts
are challenging tasks. This is why the sanitation of web pages
is sometimes outsourced to the browsers [55] or to web fire-
walls that run on the client PC [28, 31]. Even though the XSS
attacks occur on the client-side, solutions often involve server
side mechanisms. For example, in the solution of Gundy et
al. [56], the potentially vulnerable website delivers a XHTML
document with randomized namespace prefixes and a pol-
icy to the client, and the client accepts only documents that
comply with the policy.
Taint checking is a popular server-side protection mech-
anism, where the input originating from untrusted sources
is flagged as potentially malicious and subjected to further
scrutiny (e.g. sanitizing the input). The same techniques can
also be employed on the client side if combined with static
analysis of the input strings [57, 58]. There are server side
solutions, for example passive monitoring of the HTTP traf-
fic [30] or by dynamically comparing HTTP responses with a
pre-defined response [10].
Add-ons outside web applications. Even though there are
add-ons for almost any type of software, it is mostly the
browser add-ons which have undergone critical security
scrutiny. For example, Google Chrome has an add-on (or
browser extension) ecosystem, where the add-ons them-
selves [29], their architecture [11] and protection mecha-
nisms [27] have been undergone security evaluation. Similar
vetting has been done for Firefox add-ons [7–9]. As more
applications are moving to the cloud, we believe that cloud-
application add-ons deserve the same attention from the secu-
rity research community as browser add-ons.
Text editors also have add-on ecosystems (e.g. Sublime
plugins) that have been recently criticized for security vulner-
abilities. Azouri Dor analyzed several text editors, and found
that it is possible for a malicious add-on to achieve privilege
escalation on the victim’s computer [6]. The attack vector
here involves crafting a malicious add-on and tricking the
victim to install and use it within the text editor. Our attack
vector, on the other hand, simply involves injecting a mali-
cious script in a document or other item to be shared with the
victim.
9 Conclusion
Add-ons in cloud applications are a relatively new phe-
nomenon, whose vulnerabilities have not been widely studied.
In this work, we analyzed the security of these add-ons, and
we found that flaws in add-ons may introduce new security
threats to their host applications. In particular, the add-ons
do not always take care when processing untrusted input,
which can make them vulnerable to XSS attacks. The attacker
can inject malicious scripts into shared documents or emails,
which are then processed by the vulnerable add-on. Our study
demonstrated that such vulnerable add-ons appear in the wild
and that exploiting them is not difficult. Moreover, it seems
that cloud-application vendors could do more to limit what the
attacker can do once its XSS code is running in the add-on.
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